Vereinigung der Iranischen(Konstitutionalisten) Monarchisten
www.setad.org 8448501 0043
Urmazd ( Fr.) 1 Ordibehscht 2565 ,21April 2006
Iran's Sitting Duck
THERE has been a lot of debate over reports that the
United States is exploring the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Iran.
Setting aside the question of whether military action is wise — and there are
strong arguments for focusing on nonmilitary options — one thing is clear: the
nuclear option makes little sense.
Discussion focuses on Natanz, where Iran is building laboratories to enrich
uranium, ostensibly for nuclear energy but also useful for making a nuclear
bomb. Those plants are buried underground, leading many to conclude that only a
nuclear weapon could destroy them.
That conclusion is wrong. In general, there are three intertwined reasons
military planners might consider using nuclear weapons against an underground
target: uncertainty about the target's location, concern that the depth makes
conventional weapons impotent, and a need to destroy the target
near-instantaneously. None of these apply in the case of Iran.
If an underground lab were bored into a mountain, or involved a labyrinthine
tunnel system, its location may not be well known. Military planners might then
argue — as some did in considering a tactical nuclear attack on the Libyan
chemical weapons facility at Tarhuna in 1996 — that only the broad blast of a
nuclear weapon could guarantee destruction.
But the precise locations of the underground chambers at Natanz are well known —
they were built in open pits, visible to American satellites, before being
covered with concrete, rock and dirt. (And the only building at Natanz where we
know
Iran
has enriched uranium thus far is above ground.) If anyone wants to to bomb
Natanz, they will know where to aim.
The second concern is that if an underground laboratory is deeply buried, that
can also confound conventional weapons. But the depth of the Natanz facility —
reports place the ceiling roughly 30 feet underground — is not prohibitive. The
American GBU-28 weapon — the so-called bunker buster — can pierce about 23 feet
of concrete and 100 feet of soil. Unless the cover over the Natanz lab is almost
entirely rock, bunker busters should be able to reach it. That said, some chance
remains that a single strike would be unsuccessful.
That leads to the third factor. Advocates of nuclear weapons normally plan on
using them in a time-sensitive scenario: an enemy is about to launch an attack
on the
United States,
and the only way to immediately stop it is to employ nuclear arms, taking out
the enemy base in a single strike.
This is weak as a generic argument, and it is patently unsound in the case of
Iran. Natanz poses no imminent threat — the worst-case prediction is that, in
several years, the Iranians might produce enough material for a nuclear bomb,
but we do not worry that any weapons there endanger us now. The United States
could repeatedly bomb the plant, if it wished, drilling down until it reached
the underground chambers. Even if that took days, it would set back the Iranian
program just as decisively as a nuclear attack.
In the end, the nuclear option makes little sense — and flirting with it
undermines the American stance against nuclear proliferation. Taking nuclear
weapons decisively off the table would reinforce the taboo against the bomb, and
make American actions to oppose proliferation more effective.